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1. Introduction 
 
The latest report Mapping the Global Future on US national security by the National 
Intelligence Council suggests that a  major threat to the country right through to 2020 will 
be a terrorist biological weapons attack.1 Given the recent intelligence failures concerning 
biological weapons in Iraq, it might be considered that there are reasonable grounds for 
suspicion about that conclusion.  This paper attempts to answer the question of what the 
real threat of bioterror is by reference to the open scientific literature.  Section 2 of the 
paper discusses the nature of the agents of concern and in section 3 various potential 
attack scenarios are reviewed.  The overall conclusion is that there are real threats from 
terrorists with the capability to carry out a range of attacks with biological agents today, 
but that these threats do not include the one most commentators probably have in mind 
when they discuss the issue – a weapons of mass destruction scale of attack on people.  In 
the final section of this paper the implications of the analysis for the risk questions we 
have been posed are addressed. 
  
 
2. Biological Agents 
 
Biological weapons are best regarded as part of a biochemical threat spectrum that ranges 
from so-called classical (lethal) chemical weapons through poisonous industrial 
chemicals and mid-range agents such as toxins and bioregulators to traditional biological 
agents and genetically modified agents (see Figure 1).  Within this spectrum biological 
agents include well-known pathogens like anthrax, the toxins produced by bacteria such 
as botulinum toxin, and normal signalling molecules of living organisms (bioregulators) 
which, in unusual amounts, can cause massive disruption of normal physiology. 
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 Figure 1: The biochemical threat spectrum 
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 When concerns about possible biological weapon attacks grew in the 1990s, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the United States were asked to 
review what the most dangerous threats to the civilian population were.  They made their 
judgements using criteria such as:2
 
“1. public health impact based on illness and death; 
 
2. delivery potential to large populations based on stability of the agent, ability to 
mass produce and distribute a virulent agent, and potential for person-to-person 
transmission of the agent; 
 
3. public perception as related to public fear and potential civil disruption; and  
 
4. special public health preparedness needs based on stockpile requirements [for 
example vaccines], enhanced [disease] surveillance, or diagnostic needs.” 
 
Using these criteria, a list of agents posing the greatest threat to civilian populations was 
drawn up.  The most dangerous of these were designated Category A agents and included 
such things as smallpox and anthrax (see Table 1: CDC Category A agents). 
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Table 1:  CDC  Category A agents* 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Biological agent(s)   Disease 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variola major    Smallpox 
 
Bacillus anthracis   Anthrax 
 
Yersinia pestis    Plague 
 
Clostridium botulinum   Botulism 
(botulinum toxins) 
    
Francisella tularensis   Tularemia 
 
Filoviruses and Arenaviruses  Viral haemorrhagic fevers 
(e.g. Ebola virus, Lassa virus) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
* From reference 2 
 
The CDC also produced a list of Category B and C agents which, though not as 
dangerous as those in Category A, nevertheless presented a considerable risk.  However, 
when the United States National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
began its programme to develop countermeasures, it used a slightly more developed 
listing for its research agenda in which the individual agents were organised into various 
groupings (see Table 2: Category B and C agents).3  The broad grouping of agents in the 
B and C categories shown in Table 2 is obviously much easier to understand than if the 
individual agents had just been presented in a very long list. 
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Table 2:  NIAID Category B and C priority pathogens* 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Group    Biological agent   Disease/Common 
(examples)     name 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INHALATION   
BACTERIA    
Brucella species   Brucellosis 
    Burkholderia pseudomallei  Melioidosis 
    Burkholderia mallei   Glanders 
    Coxiella burnetii   Q-fever 
    Rickettsia prowazekii   Typhus 
    Rickettsia rickettsii   Rocky Mountain 
spotted fever 
 
ARTHROPOD-   
BORNE VIRUSES 
 
Alphaviruses   Venezuelan equine encephalitis VEE 
 
Flaviviruses   West Nile virus   WNV 
    Yellow fever virus   YF 
 
Bunyaviruses   California encephalitis virus  CE 
 
 
TOXINS 
 
    Ricinus communis   Ricin toxin 
    Clostridium perfringens  Epsilon toxin 
    Staphylococcal enterotoxin B  SEB 
 
 
FOOD- AND WATER- 
BORNE PATHOGENS 
 
Bacteria   Salmonella typhi   Typhoid fever 
 
Viruses   Caliciviruses    (e.g. Norwalk) 
 
Protozoa   Toxoplasma gondii   Toxoplasmosis 
 
EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 
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    Multi-drug-resistant   MDR-TB 
tuberculosis 
 
* From reference 3 
 
 
There are clearly many potential pathogens and toxins that could be used in 
various kinds of biological attacks against people.  The essential characteristics of the 
more important of these agents will be reviewed and some of the lesser known 
bioregulators will be considered.  At the end of the section some of the main agents that 
could be used to attack staple and economically valuable crops and animal husbandry 
will also be briefly reviewed.   
 
Anti-personnel BW agents 
The organisms listed as Category A and also, to some extent, those in Categories B and C 
of Tables 1 and 2 obviously include those which were weaponised in the offensive 
biological warfare programmes of the last century.  It must be appreciated that the agents 
weaponised were not chosen by chance but because they had certain characteristics useful 
to an attacker.4   Some of these characteristics are shown in Table 3.  Thus for an attacker 
it clearly makes sense if the agent produces its effect at a low dose and if the target 
population cannot be protected via immunity or medical treatment. 
 
 
Table 3:  Characteristics useful in a biological weapons agent 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
1.  An agent should produce a certain effect consistently. 
2.  The dose needed to produce the effect should be low. 
3.  There should be a short and predictable incubation period. 
4.  The target population should have little or no immunity. 
5.  Treatment for the disease should not be available to the target population. 
6.  The user should have the means to protect troops and civilians. 
7.  It should be possible to mass produce the agent. 
8.  It should be possible to disseminate the agent effectively. 
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9.  The agent should be stable in storage and transportation in munitions. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
    
 A further complication arises, of course, because not all agents would kill.  Some 
would certainly have very high rates of mortality (such as inhalation anthrax if not 
quickly treated) but others, some of which were in fact weaponised, would cause 
incapacitation rather than death in most victims.  One such incapacitant is Staphylococcal 
enterotoxin B (SEB), which was extensively studied in the US offensive programme.  
Such an incapacitant might be considered useful, for example, if enemy troops were 
mixed with civilians or if the intention was not only to disable enemy forces but also to 
overload their capacity for dealing with the injured. 
 Finally, it is crucial to differentiate between agents which are not contagious 
person-to-person after first use and those which are.  Clearly, agents such as smallpox 
which are highly contagious in this way are much more difficult for a defender to handle.  
From an attacker’s stance, such agents could be expected to have greater effects, but their 
use carries with it the potential drawback of creating uncontrollable epidemics. 
 From a military point of view, therefore, individual agents are viewed against a 
certain matrix of possibilities (Table 4).  Against that wider background, it is possible to 
see why certain agents have been and are so much favoured, in spite of the vast range of 
available pathogens known to cause illness in humans.  For simplicity, we will deal first 
with Category A agents and then with some of those in Category B. 
 
Table 4:  A military classification of agents 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Principal characteristics  Examples  Militarily significant features 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Potentially contagious 
from first victim 
 
Incapacitating    Influenza virus  Limited use 
        because of  
Lethal     Yersinia pestis  possible lack 
     (plague)  of control 
 
Not contagious from 
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first victim 
 
Incapacitating    Coxiella burnetii Decay rate in 
     (Q-fever)  air; incubation  
Lethal     Bacillus anthracis period; length of 
     (anthrax)  illness etc. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Category A agents 
Anthrax   Bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax, is a natural pathogen of 
grazing mammals.  Until the development of effective vaccines against the disease for 
these animals it was a major cause of fatal illness and it continues to kill domestic and 
wild animals where vaccination programmes are not maintained, for example during the 
disruption caused by warfare.  The environmentally-resistant spore form of the organism 
is found in the ground where infected animals have previously died.  Grazing animals can 
therefore ingest the spores or inhale them. Once inside an animal’s body the vegetative 
form of Bacillus anthracis develops, grows and multiplies and produces several toxins 
which together kill the infected animal. When the animal dies and its body decays, 
nutrients run out, oxygen becomes freely available and the environmentally-resistant 
spores form again and can remain for long periods in the soil ready to infect other 
animals.  With these characteristics, it is not surprising that in the past anthrax was also 
known as ‘woolsorter’s disease’ in England since it was a hazard for workers involved in 
processing fleeces and wool. 
Humans can contract three different forms of anthrax disease.  If the spores get 
into a skin cut then cutaneous anthrax can develop.  Eating infected meat can result in 
gastrointestinal anthrax.  In a bioweapons attack, however, the aim would be to spread 
the spores on the air so that they were taken into the lungs to cause inhalation anthrax.  
This disease develops over a period of one to seven days and is deadly if untreated.  The 
disease begins with non-specific influenza-like symptoms that make early diagnosis 
difficult, but rapidly worsens with many dangerous symptoms appearing.  Death rates for 
untreated cases are at least 90 per cent. 
Anthrax is not contagious person-to-person so there is no need to quarantine those 
infected.  Various means can be used in the laboratory to diagnose the presence of 
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Bacillus anthracis in the body and antimicrobial therapy is effective if begun early 
enough.  There is also a vaccine available in the West for people at risk of contracting the 
disease, but it requires a series of injections over time. It is uncertain whether it would be 
effective against a heavy aerosol inhalation assault.  The dose needed to infect someone 
is also the subject of great uncertainty.  The standard measure used is the dose required to 
infect 50 per cent of a population and this, the LD50, can only be estimated from animal 
experiments. 
Anthrax has been a standard choice for those interested in causing disease in 
animals and people.  It was used in the German anti-animal campaigns of the First World 
War and was weaponised as a retaliatory anti-animal weapon by the British in the Second 
World War. It was later weaponised as an anti-personnel agent by both sides in the 
twentieth century east-west cold war.  More recently, of course, anthrax has come to 
public attention following the deaths caused by leakage of the agent from a Soviet 
military facility in Sverdlovsk in 1979 and the anthrax letter attacks in the United States 
in late 2001. 
As will become apparent, preparing an agent like Bacillus anthracis for use in an 
airborne biological weapons attack is not an easy technical task.  It certainly appears to 
have taken years of experimentation to perfect in the state offensive biological weapons 
programmes of the last century.  Such ‘weapons grade’ material would have had a very 
high concentration of spores, uniform particle size, low electrostatic charge and would 
have been subject to other treatment to reduce clumping of the material.  There is, 
however, a prior problem for the would-be attacker.  Because of the natural processes of 
mutation and geographical isolation in different environments, there are many different 
strains of anthrax in various parts of the world and these have different levels of lethality 
for humans.  The first problem for a weaponeer, therefore, would be to find a virulent 
strain of anthrax. 
It is a little-known fact that before their unfortunately successful attack on the 
Tokyo underground with sarin nerve gas in 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo sect had attempted 
to use anthrax to attack their fellow citizens. It has been suggested that one of the reasons 
they failed in their biological weapon attacks was that they did not have access to a lethal 
strain of the organism. 
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Smallpox   There are two kinds of smallpox.  That caused by the virus Variola 
major commonly kills 25 to 30 per cent of those infected while infection caused by the 
vaccine strain Variola minor has a death rate of 1 per cent or less.  Closely related 
diseases such as cowpox and monkeypox exist, but smallpox appears to be uniquely an 
infection of humans.  Smallpox caused by Variola major is an acute viral disease usually 
contracted by breathing in airborne droplets which carry the virus.  In the past it seems 
likely that as many as 90 per cent of people exposed contracted the disease.  It affected 
people of all races and did not discriminate between young and old or male and female.  
The infection had only two possible outcomes - death or very long-lasting immunity.  
With no known animal reservoir, the disease could only exist as an active infection 
causing waves of epidemic disease at different times and places in history. 
 With these characteristics, it seems unlikely that the disease could have existed in 
the sparse populations of early human history.  However, it is possible that it was present 
in ancient Egypt.  Epidemics which might well have been smallpox also raged across the 
Roman Empire in the second and third centuries AD, but the descriptions of the victims 
are not clear enough to be sure.  Certainly by the ninth century AD though there are clear 
descriptions by a physician in Baghdad which leave no doubt that he differentiated 
between measles and smallpox.  Historically, therefore, the populations of the Old World, 
in Europe and the Middle East, were accustomed to smallpox as a disease by the 
sixteenth century but as these peoples began to expand and migrate to the New World 
and Asia, they encountered populations which had had no contact with the disease.  In 
those circumstances the effects of smallpox could be devastating and Europeans knew 
enough about the disease - even though they did not understand it scientifically - to use it 
for hostile purposes against the North American Indians.   
Our modern techniques of vaccination had their origin at this time in efforts to 
prevent smallpox.  The practice of variolation arose in which people were deliberately 
infected by obtaining material from an active case and scratching it into the skin.  
Practiced people who did this expertly were said to be able to keep the disease in a mild 
form with a very low consequent death rate.  It was Edward Jenner in England, of course, 
who noticed that variolation failed to produce the symptoms of smallpox in people who 
had previously suffered the mild disease cowpox.  He then vaccinated people with 
cowpox and showed that later variolation reliably failed to produce the smallpox disease.  
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Jenner published his findings in 1798 and vaccination was rapidly taken up around the 
world.  Eventually, a campaign organised by the World Health Organisation eradicated 
the disease in 1979. 
After the eradication campaign it was intended that stocks of the virus be kept in 
secure storage in just two places - the United States and the Soviet Union.  Unfortunately, 
if the accounts of some of those involved are to be believed, as part of its illegal offensive 
biological weapons programme the Soviet Union weaponised massive amounts of 
smallpox as a lethal anti-personnel agent.  Since very few people now have effective 
protection from vaccination against smallpox (having been vaccinated long ago or never 
having been vaccinated at all), an outbreak of this very contagious lethal disease could be 
devastating. 
The infective dose for smallpox is not known, but is thought to be just a few 
virions lodged in the oropharyngeal or respiratory mucosa.  At the end of an incubation 
period of 7-17 days, the patient experiences a high fever and is prostrated with head- and 
backache.  A rash then appears which, within a couple of days, turns vesicular and then 
pustular.  The pustules are deep in the skin and leave pitted scars if the patient survives.  
The patient is most infectious to others for 7-10 days after the rash appears.  Although 90 
per cent of cases follow this characteristic pattern, there are two other forms of the 
disease.  In haemorrhagic smallpox there is widespread haemorrhaging into the skin and 
mucous membranes and the patient invariably dies about five days after formation of the 
rash.  In the frequently fatal malignant variant, the pustules do not appear and the skin 
takes on a reddish-coloured rubbery form. 
Diagnoses of smallpox in its characteristic form were made from the nature and 
distribution of the rash.  Haemorrhagic and malignant smallpox were much more difficult 
to diagnose.  Just one case of smallpox now would, of course, be the cause of a 
worldwide emergency.  At present, all the treatment available to someone with smallpox 
would be supportive care and antibiotics to prevent secondary infection.  There are 
currently no antiviral agents which are effective against smallpox but vaccination 
administered within a few days of exposure may prevent or ameliorate the disease.  A 
major problem arises from the known difficulty of preventing smallpox transmission in 
hospitals.  Not only is the virus capable of airborne infection, perhaps for 24 hours, but it  
can remain viable on laundry from infected people for extended periods of time.  
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Furthermore, though many people were safely vaccinated in the past, there is always the 
danger of major complications for a few. 
Plague   The non-motile, non-spore-forming bacterium Yersinia pestis is the 
cause of plague.  Although it can remain viable for some days in water or moist soil, it is 
killed within a few hours by direct sunlight.  Plague is still a problem disease in some 
parts of the world and there were outbreaks of plague in humans in Africa, Asia and 
South America during the 1990s. 
 Yersinia pestis is a natural pathogen of rodents such as the black rat, Rattus rattus, 
and the brown rat, Rattus norvegicus.  The pathogen is transmitted between rodents and 
other animals through the bites of infected fleas.  Major outbreaks of plague can occur in 
cities when many rats are infected and the disease spreads to humans.  The normal human 
disease is bubonic plague, caused when the pathogen enters the body via regurgitation 
during a flea bite or through broken skin.  If the lungs become infected, then a much 
more deadly, pneumonic, form of plague develops.  It is this pneumonic form that would 
result from an aerosol attack if the agent was used in a biological weapon.  Because there 
are natural reservoirs of the disease in rodent populations around the world, because it 
can be mass produced and disseminated, because there is a high fatality rate in untreated 
cases and because pneumonic plague is contagious through airborne spread, it is readily 
apparent why there is great concern about the possible use of Yersinia pestis as a 
biological weapons agent. 
 The Black Death is the name given to the great pandemic of plague which 
occurred in Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and Europe in the middle of the 14th 
century.  With the centuries that have elapsed, it is difficult today to judge the death rates 
during the pandemic, but historians generally agree that it was in the range of 30 to 50 per 
cent of the population.  The effects of this mortality rate on a society that had not suffered 
such an outbreak for centuries was enormous.  The available control measures were 
largely ineffective against a disease whose cause was unknown, and there was 
considerable social disruption and change as a result of the pandemic.  The Black Death 
was, in fact, the peak of a second pandemic of plague.  The first pandemic occurred in the 
mid-sixth century AD and the third began in China in 1855, killing some 12 million 
people in India and China alone. 
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 People develop symptoms of bubonic plague between two and eight days after 
being bitten by an infected flea.  They suddenly experience fever and weakness and the 
characteristic bubos (swollen tender lymph nodes) appear a day or so later.  A small 
number of people do not develop bubos but have primary septicaemic plague.  
Septicaemia can also develop following the appearance of the bubos.  The name ‘Black 
Death’ may have derived from the appearance of gangrene in the nose, digits and other 
extremities following the onset of septicaemia.  Secondary pneumonic plague may also 
develop in a minority of people suffering from bubonic plague.  As mentioned earlier, 
following an aerosolised biological attack people would exhibit primary pneumonic 
plague and there would be no tell-tale bubos to aid diagnosis nor, unfortunately, any 
widely-available, rapid, diagnostic tests. 
 Until 1999 there was a licensed vaccine available in the United States but its 
production has been discontinued.  In any case, it apparently did not prevent or 
ameliorate the development of primary pneumonic plague and this is probably also true 
for other vaccines available around the world.  Vaccination during an epidemic would not 
be of much help anyway as immunity takes a month to build up.  It is possible to treat 
people suffering from plague successfully with antibiotics, but if this treatment is not 
begun within 24 hours of the onset of symptoms the fatality rate remains very high. 
 Under modern conditions the outbreak of a new plague pandemic seems 
improbable.  It should not be forgotten, however, that Japan tried to use plague-infected 
fleas to cause an outbreak amongst the Chinese during their mid-20th century offensive 
biological weapons programme, or that the Soviet Union later succeeded in mass-
producing Yersinia pestis. Furthermore, it is clear that antibiotic resistance can be built 
into the organism using modern techniques of genetic engineering.  Plague well deserves 
its place in the Category A list of potential biological threat agents. 
Botulinum toxin   Botulism is caused by the extremely potent toxin produced by 
the bacterium Clostridium botulinum.  Botulinum toxin is, in fact, the most poisonous 
substance known to man.  It has been estimated that, if evenly dispersed and inhaled, a 
gram could - theoretically - kill more than one million people.  Clostridium botulinum is a 
spore-forming bacterium whose spores are found naturally in the soil.  The toxin is 
produced by the growing (vegetative) form of the bacterium when it is in oxygen-limited 
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environments such as a wound or in canned food which has not been properly sterilised 
to kill the organism. 
 Seven distinct antigenic types of the toxin (A-G) have been recognised.  This 
means that an antitoxin to the A type does not neutralise the B-G types and so on.  
Botulism in humans is generally caused by the A, B, E or F toxins.  Types C and D have 
been shown to cause disease in other animal and bird species.  The toxin is not absorbed 
through intact human skin but can enter through a wound or through mucosal surfaces 
such as those of the gut or lung.  Distressing signs of the disease then follow rapidly 
within 12 to 72 hours of, say, eating contaminated food. 
 People suffering from botulism experience dysfunction of their motor nerves so, 
for example, they may have blurred vision and difficulty in speaking or swallowing.  If 
not treated rapidly and effectively, they eventually die because general muscular paralysis 
also affects their respiratory muscles and they are unable to breathe.  In the twentieth 
century botulinum toxin was soon recognised to be a potential lethal biological weapons 
agent.  The Japanese tested its effects on prisoners in their offensive biological weapons 
programme, and because of concerns that Germany might use it against the Allies on D-
Day, more than 1 million doses of botulinum toxoid vaccine were prepared.  Curiously, 
the toxin has recently been licensed for treating certain medical conditions such as types 
of muscle spasm, and for cosmetic reasons to remove wrinkles.  
 The major concern is that aerosolised botulinum toxin might be used to cause 
widespread inhalation botulism, but contamination of the food supply could also result in 
a large number of cases for the medical services to deal with.  Botulism is, unfortunately, 
easily confused with other diseases of the nervous system and laboratory tests which take 
days to complete are needed to confirm diagnosis.  Modern medical care can greatly 
diminish the death rates from botulism; antitoxins are available and if administered early 
can limit the damage to the nerves.  However, if damage does occur, the patients may 
require prolonged treatment, including feeding and mechanical ventilation, until their 
nervous systems recover.  In theory, it would be possible to eliminate the hazard of 
botulinum toxin by mass immunisation but this is unlikely to happen, partly because of 
the scarcity of the required toxoid. 
Tularemia   The disease caused by the bacterium Francisella tularensis, 
tularemia, is much less well-known to the general public than the other potential 
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biological weapons agents in Category A.  Yet it was an agent investigated by the 
Japanese and by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the last century.  The 
bacterium is normally an infection of a wide range of wild animals and for that reason is 
known in different parts of the world as an animal fever, for example, rabbit fever.  It also 
causes disease in humans, often through an insect bite.   
 Tularemia was first described as a potentially severe and fatal disease for humans 
in 1911.  Large-scale human epidemics occurred in the 1930s and 1940s in Europe and in 
the Soviet Union, and the bacterium began to be recognised as a significant laboratory 
hazard for those working with it because of its extreme infectivity. There are two 
predominant sub-types of the organism with subtype A being much more virulent than 
sub-type B.  We now know that it is one of the most infectious of the pathogenic bacteria 
with perhaps as few as 10 organisms being sufficient, if inhaled, to cause the disease in a 
human.  Person-to-person transmission of the disease has not been documented.  
Although the bacterium does not form a spore, it can survive for weeks in moist soil, hay, 
straw and the like if temperatures are low. 
 Clinical manifestations of the disease vary with the route of entry and virulence of 
the organism.  Infection through the skin, for example, usually produces an 
ulceroglandular form of the disease with an ulcer at the point of entry and swelling of the 
local lymph nodes.  There is also an abrupt onset of fever, malaise and joint and muscle 
pains.  Infection via an aerosol could produce a variety of symptoms such as pharyngitis 
or it might just be manifest as a systemic illness without such signs.  An outbreak of this 
kind in a population would result from a successful biological weapons attack after about 
3-5 days, and would be very difficult to distinguish initially from an outbreak of 
influenza or attack with a variety of other agents (see, for example, Q-fever below). 
 Vaccines are available to prevent tularemia infections and have been widely used 
in Russia since the 1930s.  The development of better ones is hindered by the lack of 
detailed knowledge of the pathogenesis caused by the microbe.  Antibiotics  are  effective 
against tularemia, but rapid confirmatory diagnosis is not simple.  A source of much 
concern is that in both the Soviet and US offensive programmes antibiotic-resistant forms 
of the organism were studied.  The overall mortality rate from the more virulent A strain 
is potentially as high as 60 per cent of untreated cases, so there is every reason for anxiety 
about this potential agent. 
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Viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHFs)   The term viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) 
refers to diseases which produce fever and bleeding as a result of infection by viruses 
from one of four different families (Table 5). The viruses are transmitted to people 
through contact with infected animals or by arthropod vectors.  The course of the disease 
varies with each different virus, but there is still a great deal to be learned about their 
natural history and the pathogenesis they cause in humans. 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Some haemorrhagic fever viruses* 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Family  Virus   Disease 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Filoviridae 
   Ebola   Ebola haemorrhagic fever 
 
   Marburg  Marburg haemorrhagic fever 
 
Arenaviridae 
   Lassa   Lassa fever 
 
Bunyaviridae 
   Rift Valley fever Rift Valley fever 
 
Flaviviridae 
   Dengue  Dengue fever 
 
   Yellow fever  Yellow fever 
 
* From reference 2 
 
 
Of the 284 detected cases in the June 1976 outbreak of Ebola in the Sudan, 148 
died -  a 52 per cent mortality rate.  In the subsequent September outbreak in Zaire there 
were 288 deaths out of the 318 cases - a 90.5 per cent mortality.  A smaller outbreak in 
Zaire in 1979 resulted in a 66 per cent mortality rate.  There were no substantial reported 
outbreaks through the 1980s until, in 1989, a shipload of monkeys from the Philippines, 
destined for the United States, was found to be infected.  Sixty of the one hundred 
monkeys died but fortunately the outbreak was contained. 
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 If the VHF viruses are considered as potential biological weapons agents, it is 
clear that some are not suitable.  Dengue, for example, is not transmissible as a small-
particle aerosol.  Others certainly are the cause of great concern.  In the Soviet Union’s 
offensive biological weapons programme it was shown that just a few virions of Marburg 
were sufficient to cause infection and large quantities of this virus, along with Ebola and 
Lassa viruses, were produced.  The United States investigated Yellow fever and Rift 
Valley fever viruses in its offensive programme.  Rift Valley fever and the flaviviruses 
(Yellow fever etc.) are not transmissible person to person, but agents like Ebola can 
spread through close contact very effectively if special precautions are not taken. 
 There is, of course, an effective vaccine for individuals travelling to areas where 
Yellow fever may be present.  However, this vaccine could not be used after a biological 
attack because the disease has a shorter incubation period than that needed for the 
development of antibodies and in any case, the vaccine is in relatively short supply 
worldwide.  There is no licensed vaccine, even in the United States, against any other 
virus in the VHF group. 
 Filoviruses like Ebola and Marburg are extremely virulent in non-human primates 
and in man, and infection results in widespread damage to the viscera (such as liver, 
spleen and kidneys).  However, the variable clinical picture that can result from 
infections with these viruses makes diagnoses very difficult.  Confirmatory laboratory 
tests are available but cannot be completed within hours.  The antiviral drug ribavirin 
may help in some cases, but the main treatment available is careful supportive medicine - 
which may not be possible if there are very many victims of an attack. 
 Studies have shown that viruses like Ebola, Marburg and Lassa can successfully 
cause infection in non-human primates when prepared in aerosols and inhaled into the 
lungs so there is every reason to believe that they could cause massive human casualties 
in a successful BW attack.  Little wonder then that they are placed in the most dangerous 
- Category A - list of potential biological weapons agents.  
 
Category B and C agents 
As evidenced by the groupings of potential agents in the United States NIAID listing of 
Category B and C agents (see Table 2 earlier in this section) a wide range of different 
possibilities for attack were considered.  The groups - inhalation bacteria, arthropod-
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borne viruses, toxins, food-and-water-borne pathogens and even emerging infectious 
diseases - show just how different the mechanism of attack could be.  In no sense can the 
threat from such agents be ignored.  Indeed, a number of these pathogens were 
weaponised in the offensive biological weapons programmes of the last century.  It is not 
possible to review in detail all the agents listed in Table 2 so some illustrative examples 
are presented here. 
Brucellosis in humans results from infection by any of the four main species of 
Brucella.  These bacterial species are normal pathogens of animals: Brucella melitensis 
infects goats; Brucella abortus infects cattle; Brucella canis infects dogs; and Brucella 
suis infects pigs.  The cause of the disease was first worked out by David Bruce in Malta 
in 1887.  He showed that the undulant (or Malta) fever prevalent among civilians and 
British troops on the island resulted from infection by Brucella melitensis originating 
from the island’s goats.  The bacterial cells are able to persist in the environment for 
weeks and human infections often result from eating raw animal products or drinking 
unpasteurized milk.  In dried preparations the bacteria can remain virulent for years and 
infection by aerosol requires only a few organisms.  Laboratory infections are therefore 
common among laboratory staff working with the organism, although person-to-person 
transmission is rare. 
 The incubation period for a brucellosis infection can be highly variable, usually 
between 5 and 60 days.  Severe exposure would result in a shorter incubation period.  
Symptoms include an undulating fever, exhaustion, back and leg pains, headaches and so 
on.  Without treatment, people usually recover after two to three months, but there can be 
cycles of remission and relapse over years and serious complications can result.  Fatality 
rates are some 3 per cent or less, but the illness is debilitating and though antibiotic 
treatment can be a successful if begun early enough, no human vaccine is available to 
protect against the disease.  With such characteristics, it is not surprising to find that 
Brucella suis was weaponised as an incapacitating agent in the US offensive biological 
weapons programme of the mid-twentieth century. 
Q-fever   Another pathogen weaponised as an incapacitant in the US programme 
was Coxiella burnetii.  This causes so-called Q-fever in humans, the Q standing for 
‘Query’ because of the initially uncertain nature of the disease.  It was first identified in 
Australia and was initially recognised as an infection affecting abbatoir workers in 
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Brisbane.  The scientific name of the organism honours Cox and Burnet, the scientists 
who made significant discoveries in the early work on the organism. 
 The pathogen is found in many wild animals as well as in livestock and its natural 
life-cycle includes transition through tick species.  However, it is so infectious to humans 
in an aerosol and so stable in the environment that human infection usually occurs 
through inhalation of dust containing the organism. The clinical features of the disease 
begin after an incubation period of 18-21 days (again unless the dose is large when it 
becomes shorter) and include chills, fever, headache, muscle and chest pains.  There can 
also be nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea.  The mortality rate is less than one per cent, but 
the illness can persist for months.  A vaccine is available in Australia and antibiotics can 
be successful if given early in the infection. 
 During the US offensive programme in the 1950s, members of the Seventh Day 
Adventist Church who did not wish to be conscripted into the armed forces could 
volunteer instead to be subjects for human testing of some biological warfare agents in 
what was called “Project Whitecoat.”  One of the agents studied in this way was Coxiella 
burnetii so there are good data on the infectivity of aerosols of this particular agent and 
every reason to believe that it would severely affect the health of a large percentage of 
those exposed to an attack.  While it is not contagious and does not cause the high 
mortality of the Category A agents, Q-fever is obviously still a disease which could cause 
massive problems for a military organisation or a civilian population.  Its causative agent 
well deserves its place in the Category B listing. 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE)  At the time when the US offensive 
biological weapons programme was in operation much more was known about bacteria 
than about viruses and so there was much more work done on bacterial than on viral 
agents.  During the later cold war period we know that in the Soviet programme more 
attention was paid to viral agents.  However, one viral agent, Venezuelan equine 
encephalitis (VEE) virus, was weaponised by the United States.  This virus is on the 
NIAID Category B and C list in the arthropod-borne viruses group (Table 2).   
 Epidemics of VEE were first recognised in the 1930s and the disease is endemic 
in the central and northern parts of South America.  The virus usually exists through a 
rodent-mosquito-rodent cycle but humans become infected naturally through the bite of 
infected mosquitoes when the disease spreads to an equine-mosquito cycle also.  There is 
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no evidence of direct equine-to-human or human-to-human transmission. However, 
humans can be infected through an aerosolised agent and again it is clear that very few 
organisms are required to initiate the disease. 
 The disease manifests itself with an abrupt onset of influenza-like symptoms: 
severe headache, high fever, chills and muscle pains.  It can also produce nausea, 
vomiting and diarrhoea.  Most infections last 3 to 5 days and mortality rates are below 
one per cent.  However, there can be major effects on the central nervous system with 
severe consequences for a few people.  Fortunately, there are a number of vaccines 
available to prevent the disease in humans in affected regions of the world. 
Staphylococcus aureus enterotoxin type B (SEB)   Although it was difficult to 
produce large amounts of many bacterial toxins at the time the United States, in its 
offensive biological weapons programme, did weaponise an incapacitating toxin in 
addition to the lethal botulinum toxin.  This incapacitating toxin was Staphylococcus 
aureus enterotoxin type B or SEB as it became known.  The five different types of 
staphylococcal enterotoxin are a frequent cause of food poisoning through improperly 
stored or cooked foods such as ham, processed meats, ice-cream and the like.  Symptoms 
are usually nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea and normally occur within one to six hours of 
eating contaminated food.  They are of relatively short duration - about 24 hours. 
 Inhalation of staphylococcal enterotoxin B causes a sudden onset of fever, 
headache, chills and a non-productive cough.  The victim is likely to suffer these 
symptoms and be prostrated for up to five days and the cough can persist for weeks.  The 
disabling dose for humans has been estimated to be very small in relation to body weight 
and the lethal dose to be at least 50 times greater.  The toxin is known to trigger the 
release of massive amounts of cytokines (bioregulators) in the body which then produce 
the symptoms in the victim.  It is readily apparent why SEB is on the list of Category B 
agents of concern. 
BZ   Another more direct interference with the body’s chemical signalling system 
is caused by BZ - 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate.  This is usually classed as a chemical 
incapacitating agent and appropriately, since it was weaponised by the United States 
during the cold war, is on one of the schedules of particularly dangerous chemicals 
subject to special international oversight in the Chemical Weapons Convention.  BZ is 
one of a family of chemicals called glycollates and it interferes with the transmission of 
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information between nerve fibres.  At particular types of synapses (junctions between the 
fibres), BZ blocks the receptor on the post-synaptic nerve fibre so that the synapse does 
not function and the signal is not transmitted.  The Iraqis were said to have produced 
another glycollate named Agent 15.  Such so-called bioregulators are also covered by the 
prohibition on toxins in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.   
Ricin   Another toxin on the Category B list is ricin, a highly toxic glycoprotein 
which is found in the seeds (beans) of the widely-cultivated castor oil plant, Ricinus 
communis.  Ricin can be dangerous if inhaled or ingested but does not cross intact skin.  
It acts by inhibiting protein synthesis in the body’s cells and causes damage by killing the 
cells.  At present the only treatment that can be given is supportive care and there is no 
vaccine available for human use.  Ricin is a danger because it can be extracted relatively 
easily from castor oil beans.  About one million tons of these beans are processed 
annually and ricin accounts for some five per cent of the residual waste.  It is little 
wonder, therefore, that some of the terrorists arrested recently appear to have been trying 
to produce ricin since it is perhaps the easiest such agent to obtain in quantity. 
Salmonellosis   The importance of considering attacks other than with aerosolised 
agents is shown by events in Oregon, USA in 1984.  On 17 September, the public health 
department there began to be notified of people falling ill with gastroenteritis after eating 
at restaurants in the small town of The Dalles.  Because the affected people reported 
eating in salad bars, all salad bars were closed down on 25 September.  It was eventually 
shown that at least 750 people had became ill with salmonellosis caused by the bacterium 
Salmonella typhimurium.  There are many thousands of such cases caused by food 
contamination with the bacterium annually so nothing too unusual was suspected at the 
time.  However, it was later discovered that the salad bars had been deliberately 
contaminated by followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh. 
 The sect had purchased a large ranch in the region and was seeking to prevent 
people voting in a local election so that they could more easily gain permission for 
developments they wished to make on their land.  Commune members were, in fact, just 
trialling a plan for making people ill on the forthcoming election day for county 
commissioners in November 1984.  The sect had grown the bacteria in secret laboratories 
and then poured them onto items in the salad bars.  Eventually, the FBI discovered vials 
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containing the bacteria on the sect’s ranch and two members pleaded guilty and served 
prison sentences for their activities. 
 Though Salmonella typhimurium itself is not on the list of agents of concern, this 
criminal activity shows just why food- and water-borne pathogens such as Salmonella 
typhi, the cause of typhoid fever, and Shigella dysenteriae, the cause of bacillary 
dysentery, certainly are on NIAID’s Category B and C priority list.  Clearly, if the sect 
members had carried out widespread food contamination with a more virulent agent in a 
town, they could have caused many many more people to become ill - and they might 
well not have been detected as the perpetrators of the deliberate contamination. 
 
Anti-agriculture biological warfare 
The diversity of the anti-personnel forms of biological warfare should remind us that 
biological warfare need not only be directed against people.  Microbial pathogens cause 
enormous problems in agriculture and some of these pathogens are clearly also suitable 
for deliberate use.  Animal husbandry is particularly vulnerable, in part because it is often 
very intensive, with many animals kept in confined areas.  It is also vulnerable because 
the animals reared are often from very limited genetic stock so that a large percentage of 
them could succumb to a single strain of pathogen.  Finally, as is well known from 
disease outbreaks such as the recent Foot-and-Mouth disease (FMD) in the UK, the viral 
agents which cause disease in animal stocks are often particularly virulent. 
Foot-and-Mouth disease is a very contagious disease of cloven-hoofed animals 
(cattle, pigs, sheep, goats etc).  There are seven different serotypes of the virus and no 
cross immunity between these types.  The disease can be highly lethal to young calves, 
but usually lethality is low.  The problems lie in the serious production losses caused by 
the disease and, of course, in the measures that have to be taken to eradicate the outbreak.  
Natural infections have an incubation period of two to eight days.  The symptoms of 
FMD are fever, loss of appetite and cessation of milk production in cows.  Vesicles 
develop, particularly around the mouth and the feet, and then rupture to leave painful 
ulcers.  FMD can be difficult to distinguish from a number of other infections, and 
collection and analysis of samples has to be done with great care because the organism is 
so contagious.  Infected animals release the virus in saliva, milk, faeces, urine and 
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exhaled air.  It is a hardy virus and is known to have survived kilometres of air-borne 
transmission to cause a new outbreak of disease elsewhere. 
Newcastle disease is another very highly contagious viral disease and affects both 
domestic and wild birds.  The different strains of the disease vary widely in virulence but 
some cause high lethality in domestic fowls, turkeys and pheasants.  The incubation 
period of the disease is generally about five days.  Its effects are variable but in its most 
virulent viscerotropic velogenic form (VVND) there is a sudden  arrival and spread of the 
disease.  Birds lose appetite and their egg production drops off very sharply.  Profuse 
bright green diarrhoea is common and there is extremely rapid dehydration.  Many birds 
die within a day or two and the mortality rate can be over 90 per cent.  As with FMD, the 
virus is hardy and is excreted in faeces and in exhaled air.   In affected areas there can be 
significant reservoirs of infection in wild birds, thus providing means for further disease 
outbreak to be initiated. 
With effects such as these two diseases produce it is little wonder that anti-animal 
biological warfare was investigated thoroughly in the major offensive programmes of the 
last century.  Indeed, biological warfare in the First World War was directed by both 
sides against the valuable draft animal stocks of the other.  The first really viable 
biological weapon was produced by the British in their anthrax-laced cattle cakes for 
potential use against the German cattle industry.  Pathogens like FMD and Newcastle 
disease are of interest today, when there are worries about possible bioterrorism, because 
they do not affect humans.  The people producing and using such an agent would 
therefore be at little risk of infection in the process.  Given the importance of animal 
husbandry, such means could be very attractive to those wanting to economically damage 
a country.5   
Plant pathogens   We just have to be reminded of the nineteenth century Irish 
potato famine to realise how devastating fungal diseases can be to staple crops.  In fact, 
all staple and economically important crops have to be constantly guarded against the 
ravages of pests and diseases and even then there can be huge production losses.  It is 
hardly surprising, therefore, that virtually all state-level offensive biological weapons 
programmes of which we have knowledge today carefully investigated anti-plant attacks. 
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 In 1997, during the negotiations in Geneva aimed at strengthening the BTWC 
(which later failed), the South African delegation put forward a document6 which 
discussed plant pathogens according to the following set of criteria: 
- agents known to have been developed, produced or used as weapons; 
- agents which have severe socio-economic and/or significant adverse human 
health impacts, due to their effects on staple crops, to be evaluated against a 
combination of the following considerations. 
The considerations were: 
 - ease of dissemination (e.g. wind, insect, water etc.); 
 - short incubation period and/or difficult to diagnose/identify at an early stage; 
 - ease of production; 
 - stability in the environment; 
 - lack of availability of cost-effective protection/treatment; 
 - low infective dose; 
 - high infectivity; 
 - short life-cycle. 
Ten plant pathogens were then identified as potential anti-plant biological weapons 
agents (Table 6). 
 
 
Table 6:  Potential anti-plant biological weapons agents* 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Disease   Agent     Comment 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Coffee berry disease  Colletotrichium coffeanum  Could cause serious 
         economic damage 
 
Blight of pines  Dothistroma pini   Could cause 
economic damage 
 
Fire blight of apple,  Erwinia amyovora   Could cause 
pear and related       economic damage 
species 
 
Potato, tomato wilt,  Pseudomona solanaceorum  Could cause 
Moko disease of       economic damage  
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banana etc. 
 
Blast disease of rice  Pyricularia oryzae   Extremely destructive 
         of this staple crop 
 
Maize smut   Ustilago maydis   Could cause 
economic damage 
 
Leaf scald of sugarcane Xanthomonas albilineans  Could cause 
economic damage 
 
Bacterial blight of rice Xanthomonas campestris  Extremely destructive 
         of this staple crop 
 
Cover smut, stinking  Tilletia tritici    Extremely destructive 
smut, common bunt       of this staple crop 
of wheat 
 
Cottony soft rot,  Sclerotinia sclerotorium  Could cause  
white mould and        economic damage 
watery soft rot on 
vegetables, beans, 
soya etc. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
* From reference 6 
 
 The  potential of plant pathogens was not lost on the bioweaponeers of the last 
century.  The United States, for example, is known to have weaponised agents to attack 
wheat and rice staple crops.  As can be seen from the comments in Table 6, such attacks 
on wheat and rice could be extremely destructive.  The danger of attacks on crops has 
increased in recent years because of great advances in our understanding of biocontrol of 
plant pests and plant inoculants.  Indeed, it has been suggested that efforts to develop 
fungal agents to attack drug crops such as poppies could be dangerous, at the very least in 
developing techniques that could be used in biological warfare.  As with animal 
husbandry, the plant species used in agriculture are often of an extremely limited variety.  
Such monocultures are particularly open to attack with biological agents 
 
Agent production and dissemination 
 In the early 1990s the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) did 
a detailed open analysis of the technologies underlying weapons of mass destruction 
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(WMD).7  For nuclear weapons, they concluded that the “[c]heapest overt production 
route for one bomb per year, with no international controls, is about $200 million.”  For 
chemical weapons, they concluded that an “[a]rsenal for substantial military 
capability...likely to cost tens of millions of dollars.”  In regard to biological weapons, 
however, their opinion was that “[e]nough for a large arsenal may cost less than $10 
million.”  There is therefore a great difference in the resources required to obtain a 
nuclear as against a biological weapons of mass destruction capability.  
An attacker who has obtained a pathogen with the required characteristics for the 
purpose  intended (see Table 3) still faces considerable difficulties - for example, in mass 
producing the agent and effectively disseminating it.  Mass production is difficult enough 
in itself but if a massive aerosolized attack is planned effective dissemination is 
extremely difficult. 
To produce something like the anthrax bacterium there is a need for the seed stock (a 
small amount of the pathogen) and for standard fermenters such as those used in industry 
for the production of yoghurt, beer, antibiotics and vaccines.  According to the OTA, in 
1943 a pilot anthrax plant became operational at Fort Detrick, Maryland which was 
staffed by 500 scientists, engineers and technicians.  Based on the experience of running 
this plant: 
 
“...the decision was made to build a full-scale plant at Vigo, Indiana, at a cost of 
$8 million, where 1,000 workers would manufacture more than 500,000 anthrax 
bombs a month...” 
 
The plant was completed, but never actually went into production because the war had 
ended.  However, the scale of productive capabilities cannot be misunderstood. 
 Fortunately, all the evidence in the open literature strongly suggests that is is very 
difficult to achieve effective distribution of an agent in order to cause mass human 
casualties.  According to the OTA, the technical hurdles are these: 
- the munition or delivery system must generate a cloud of aerosol particles with  
dimensions that allow them to be inhaled deep into the lungs of the target personnel; 
- the agent must be physically stabilized so that it can survive the process of 
dissemination long enough to infect the target population; 
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- the agent must disseminate slowly meanwhile avoiding loss of viability or toxicity; 
and 
- the overall size and shape of the aerosol cloud and the concentration of agent within 
it must be reasonably predictable, so that the dispersion pattern can be matched to the 
target. 
These demanding technical hurdles have been overcome several times in state-level 
offensive biological weapons programmes, but they appear still to be beyond the 
capabilities of sub-state (terrorist or criminal) groups.  Though WMD capabilities may be 
beyond sub-state groups today, nevertheless terrorists may still be able to do great harm 
through lesser capabilities without such demanding requirements. 
 
Non-WMD attacks on people 
A May 2004 report by the US Congressional Research Service was titled Small-scale 
Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and 
Preliminary Comparisons.8 The report cautioned against thinking dominated by the 
requirements for a state-level offensive programme designed to achieve a capability for 
launching massive aerosolised attacks and causing WMD-level casualties.  Since the 
information we have in the public record comes from such state-level offensive 
programmes, it is understandable if our thinking is dominated by state-level 
requirements.  However, as the report points out: 
 
“…for terrorist distribution of a C/B [chemical/biological] agent, many steps 
considered to have a high practical difficulties may be nonexistent in the case 
of terrorist groups that wish to launch only a small-scale attack and that have 
a low regard for their personal safety…” 
 
It then gives flow charts for a state programme and a terrorist programme (reproduced 
here as Figure 2) which show the sequence of steps required for these different types of 
programme to achieve their objectives. 
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Figure 2: Necessary steps for a programme to achieve its objectives 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
The report points out that the steps italicised in the state  programme flow chart would 
not be needed in that of the terrorists.  They would not need agents with a long shelf life, 
they would not need to optimise the functions of a large-scale dissemination device, to 
develop rigorous prophylaxis methods or to optimise the manufacture of large amounts of 
agent.  The technical difficulties for the terrorists would clearly be very much reduced.  If 
a terrorist group analysed the major disruptive effects of the very small scale use of 
anthrax (albeit lethal) in mail attacks in the USA in 2001, it might well decide that a 
relatively small attack using rather crude technology and at some risk to its own 
personnel would help it gain its objectives.  So small-scale, low-level, technology attacks 
cannot be dismissed as totally unlikely in the future. 
 The Congressional Research Service report went on to analyse the agents which 
appear in standard lists such as those of the CDC, but not from the usual perspective of 
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which would be most dangerous coming from a state-level military programme, but 
rather from a terrorist’s perspective.  A virus like Marburg, for instance, would standardly 
be viewed as a high-level threat (in the Category A listing, see above), but since it is not 
easily obtainable in nature it gets downranked in this perspective.  As the report notes: 
 
“…C/B agents that were considered high threats in other frameworks appear 
to present a lesser threat when viewed in the small scale attack context.  
Conversely, C/B agents that were considered of lesser threat when 
considering mass casualty attacks may be ranked more highly in the small 
scale context, as barriers to mass use may be missing when the agent is used 
on a small scale…” 
 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the report went on to say “[b]ecause of the differences, 
policies designed to protect against catastrophic C/B attack may not provide equivalent 
protection against small scale C/B attack.”  It is not certain whether this view is widely 
held or if it is informing policies designed to counter terrorism. 
 
3. Attack Scenarios Today 
 
It is important to realise that an attacker could have any one of a variety of different 
objectives in carrying out a biological weapons attack.  A criminal or terrorist group 
might use a small amount of agent in an assassination attempt, or a modest amount of 
agent in order to cause public fear and disorder.  A state might use a large-scale release of 
biological agent for strategic military purposes or as a weapon of mass destruction 
against a civilian population (Table 7).  So we are not dealing with just one type of 
‘biological bomb’ but a very wide range of possible types and scales of attack.  
Furthermore, the target of the attack could be humans, animals or plants. 
 
Table 7:  Types of biological attack 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Scale of agent release   Nature of aggressor 
 
   Individual  Subnational group State
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Point source  e.g. criminal act e.g. assassination e.g. assassination 
 
Medium scale  e.g. criminal act e.g. terrorism  e.g. military tactical 
 
Large scale  not possible  e.g. national  e.g. military strategic 
liberation army 
(use) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Anti-personnel attacks 
The well-known literature on use of biological weapons as weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) by spreading an agent in an effective manner on the air over a large area will be 
considered first followed by a discussion of potential terrorist attacks on a lesser scale.  
 
WMD attacks 
In 1969, in the run-up to the eventual negotiation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, a report on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the 
Effects of Their Possible Use was produced by the United Nations Secretary General.9  In 
its second chapter the report analysed the probable effects of biological weapons as 
against nuclear and chemical weapons.  The relevant table is reproduced in part here 
(Table 8).  It is immediately obvious from this table that in the right conditions a single 
bomber could affect a huge area with a biological weapons agent.  The area would be 
much larger than that affected even by a large one megaton nuclear weapon (100,000km2 
as against 300km2) and the expected death rate would be 25 per cent of the victims of the 
attack.  
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Table 8: Probable effects of the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (carried 
on a single bomber) on an unprotected population* 
      
Type of Weapon 
Criterion  Nuclear  Chemical  Biological 
(one megaton)  (15 tons of nerve (10 tons of 
   agent)   biological agent) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Area Affected  Up to 300 km2  Up to 60 km2  Up to 100,000 km2
 
Time to onset   Seconds  Minutes  Days 
of effect 
 
Damage to  Destruction over None   None 
structures  100 km2
 
Maximum effect 90 per cent  50 per cent  50 per cent 
on man  deaths   deaths   morbidity: 25 per 
         cent deaths if no 
         medical 
         intervention 
 
* From reference 9 
 
 
Though the report was appropriately guarded in stressing that these probable effects were 
the result of judgements and much would depend on the prevailing conditions (e.g. the 
weather) during a biological weapons attack, the people involved in producing the report 
were of the stature, for example, of Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to the 
Government of the United Kingdom, who had access to the results of all experimentation 
done in the British offensive biological weapons programme in the years during and 
following the Second World War.  The report should therefore leave no doubt in any 
reasonable mind that biological weapons could be used as weapons of mass destruction. 
By the early 1990s it was possible to add to this United Nations report a variety of 
estimates from other open sources.10  These all lead to the same conclusion - that 
biological weapons could, if used in an appropriate manner, cause huge levels of disease 
and death.  Consequently, they have to be regarded as weapons of mass destruction 
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equivalent in many ways to nuclear weapons.  Some of these estimates are set out in 
Table 9.  The first case in the table was described by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) in volume two of its classic 1970s study, The Problem of 
Chemical and Biological Warfare.  The second case was analysed in careful detail by 
Steve Fetter in the major journal International Security in 1991 and the third and fourth 
cases are taken from the 1993 US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study, 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks. 
 
Table 9: Some publicly-available information comparing large-scale attacks using 
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons* 
 
 
Study (case) Weapon System Area Affected (km2)  Fatalities 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
I 
SIPRI 
Bomber 10-kt nuclear   30   n.a. 
  biological agent  0-50   n.a. 
  VX nerve gas   0.75   n.a. 
  5-kt high explosive  0.22   n.a. 
 
II 
International 
Security 
Missile 20-kt nuclear   n.a.   40,000 dead and 
on sparsely        40,000 injured 
populated 300 kg Sarin   n.a.   200-3,000 
city  30 kg anthrax spores  n.a.   20,000-80,000 
 
III 
OTA 
Missile 12.5 kt nuclear  7.8   23,000-80,000 
on sparse to 300 kg Sarin   0.22   20-200 
moderately 30 kg anthrax spores  10   30,000-100,000 
populated 
city 
 
IV 
OTA 
Line 100kg anthrax spores  46 (clear day)   130-460,000 
attack     140 (overcast)   420,000- 1.4 million 
     360 (clear night)  1-3 million 
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* From reference 10 
 
What is clear from the first three cases is that they support the view put forward in 
the 1969 United Nations report, that a biological agent delivered effectively by bomb or 
missile would cause huge levels of casualties in the target population.  Furthermore, 
during the state-level offensive biological weapons programmes of the last century the 
bioweaponeers made great advances in the effectiveness of their weapons.  This is 
evident if we consider the fourth case in Table 9. 
It had been shown that the most effective way to use a biological weapon was to 
spray it in a line (say from a plane) so that the material drifted across the target.  This was 
best done at night so that ultraviolet (UV) light from the sun did not kill off the (anthrax) 
bacteria.  The OTA example assumed that the attack was on Washington D.C. in the 
United States.  The three sets of conditions under which the attack was carried out were: 
a clear, sunny day with a light breeze; an overcast day or night with a moderate wind; and 
worst of all, a clear calm night.  Analysis of where various quantities of the 100kg of 
anthrax spores sprayed in a line on the windward side of the city would land, and the 
concentrations required to infect and kill, suggested that in the worst case some 1 to 3 
million people would die. 
As we have seen in section 2, it would be possible to treat people with antibiotics 
successfully if treatment started early enough.  However, whether any public health 
system could cope with such numbers seems unlikely, even if the attack was detected.  
Additionally, if a genetically-manipulated organism with built-in antibiotic resistance 
were used, even early treatment might not work.  We clearly have to accept that 
biological weapons could be used as weapons of mass destruction, even if the actual 
outcome of an attack might vary considerably in different weather conditions.  It will also 
be noted from Tables 8 and 9 that the calculated effects of the use of a biological agent 
like anthrax far exceed those of a nerve gas. 
 
Non-WMD attacks 
Also in the run-up to the negotiation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) produced, in 1970, the first edition of its report on 
 34
Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons.11  This is interesting because it 
analysed cases of weapons of mass destruction usage and also lesser-scale attacks using 
biological weapons. 
The WHO report considered WMD-style attacks using tularemia as the biological 
agent against a city of 5 million people in a developed country with good medical 
resources and on a similar-sized city in a developing country, and against a city of 
500,000 people, again in both a developed and a developing country.  These cases do not 
change the overall conclusion derived from the earlier case studies discussed here, but 
they give more detail on the problems that would be encountered by the health and 
municipal authorities.  A similar analysis was given for an attack using plague against a 
city of 5 million in a developed country (with antibiotics available) and against a similar-
sized city in a developing country (with only a small supply of antibiotics).  As might be 
expected, in the latter case for plague it was suggested that a total death toll of 250,000 
could result from the successive waves of epidemic caused by the agent. 
 What is of particular interest, however, is that the WHO report went on to look at 
the sabotage of water supplies with biological agents.  The authors considered 
contamination at the intake or treatment works, at the raw or treated water reservoirs and 
at a trunk or transmission main.  They dismissed the idea of a takeover (or staff 
corruption) at the treatment plant as it would require the attacker to have very special 
access and favourable conditions – although it would obviously lead to a worst-case 
scenario.  They also dismissed the idea of contamination of a water reservoir as a means 
of effective sabotage.  In their opinion, controlled injection of an agent into a trunk main 
“would be potentially the most devastating in effect, difficult to prevent and detect, and 
feasible in practice in many water systems.” 
 Two of the hypothetical cases considered in the report used, as the contaminating 
agents: 
 
“(a) the typhoid bacillus, which produces no recognisable symptoms for 
about 1 week; and 
(b) botulinal toxin, type A, which would produce no recognizable symptoms 
until 6 or 8 hours after ingestion and, in a stabilized form, would resist 
denaturation by the elements found in a normal water supply…” 
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The report noted that these agents would likely escape detection and could produce 
effects at low concentration so that only a small bulk of initial contaminant would be 
required.  It also suggested that if there was a chlorine residue left in the mains its effect 
on the agents could be reduced by simultaneous injection of a dechlorinating agent. 
 The hypothetical attacks were deemed to take place without warning so that no 
special precautions were undertaken by the authorities, and the attackers were assumed to 
have knowledge of the mains systems layout so that they could achieve maximum effect.  
So that impossibly large amounts of agent were not required it was assumed that 1 kg of 
freeze-dried culture of typhoid bacillus was used to attack a city with a population of one 
million-plus and for botulinum toxin an attack with 0.24kg of toxin on a city of 50,000 
was considered.  Clearly, if the typhoid bacillus was used in such circumstances, with no 
recognizable symptoms for a week the authorities could take no immediate remedial 
action.  For an attack with botulinum toxin, because symptoms begin to appear after 6-8 
hours the authorities might be able to warn people not to drink the water until it had been 
flushed clear of contamination.  For both agents two patternss of water consumption were 
considered.  For two industrial communities, one of a million-plus and one of 50,000 in a 
temperate climate, it was assumed that 15 per cent of people would not drink water direct 
from the tap in the relevant period.  For two non-industrialised cities of 1million-plus and 
50,000 in a tropical area, it was assumed that everyone would drink the tap water in a 3-4 
day period. 
 The percentages of people who would be infected by different levels of typhoid 
bacillus are known from other studies of human volunteers.  In the first case of a large 
industrial city in a temperate climate, it was assumed that the amount of water drunk per 
person was 0.5 litre per day.  The total number of typhoid cases was then calculated to be 
about 35,000 and assuming that early and effective use of antibiotics reduced the fatality 
rate to 0.6 per cent, a total number of 200 deaths was assumed.  In the second case of a 
large non-industrialised city in a hot climate, water consumption was assumed to be 2.0 
litres per person each day.  It was calculated that 105 micro-organisms would be delivered 
to over 125,000 people (out of the million in the city) and cause many of them to become 
ill.  If no facilities were available for mass treatment it was suggested that some 4,500 
people might die. 
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 In regard to the botulinum toxin attacks on two cities of 50,000 people, one 
industrial in a temperate climate, one non-industrialised in a hot climate, because of the 
rapidity of onset of symptoms and the extreme toxicity of the agent the figures assumed 
for deaths were much higher – around 30,000 people.  There was little difference between 
the two cities because there was little chance in either – for the people who received 
lethal doses – to apply modern medical treatments. 
 Such hypothetical examples reinforce the conclusions drawn from studies of what 
happens when pathogenic contamination of food and water occasionally causes problems 
even in developed countries.  These suggest that sabotage with pathogenic micro-
organisms or their toxic products cannot realistically be ignored as a threat to the general 
population.  Contamination of the food supply chain or soft drink production, for 
example, could also be considered by terrorists with malign intentions. 
 
Anti-agriculture attacks 
Plant pathogens cause huge losses in agricultural production so it is hardly surprising that 
the bioweaponeers of the last century gave careful consideration to deliberate destruction 
of the staple food crops of their potential enemies.   A document dated March 1958 and 
released under the United States Freedom of Information Act, for example, was titled The 
Importance of Rice and the Possible Impact of Antirice Warfare.12  The 185-page 
document was a study of how China might be attacked through destruction of its rice 
crop, thereby reducing the country’s “capability and will to wage war.”  Among its 
conclusions, the report noted that: 
 
“A susceptible period for attacking rice exists shortly after transplanting, an 
operation readily apparent by aerial observation and suitable as a reference 
for timing an attack.” 
 
The idea was that by spreading a biological agent on the crop at this early stage the 
pathogen would cause a primary infection to grow and disperse spores which would then 
cause secondary infections.  The amount of material that would have to be used by an 
attacker would therefore be quite small.   
It is difficult to overstate the scope of the work.  The document reported studies 
on the susceptibility of different rice varieties to different isolates of the chosen fungus.  
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The aim here was to use a mixture of different types of the fungal agent Piricularia 
oryzae so that any variation in the type of rice being grown would not affect the 
consequences of an attack. The main rice-growing areas of China at the time were 
analysed, as were the average contributions of the rice crop to the daily calorific intake of 
the Chinese population.  The report suggested that a two-pronged attack would be 
effective, with a biologically active chemical agent being used where the environment 
was not suitable for use of the pathogen, but “[w]here the environment is suitable for the 
use of an antirice pathogen it should be used.”  Piricularia oryzae causes rice blast and its 
spores could be easily produced by methods perfected in the United States.  The dried 
spores were stable in storage and resistant to environmental degradation.   
The possibility of large-scale attacks on staple crops such as rice has to be taken 
seriously.  As is clear from the discussion of available agents in Section 2, it would also 
be quite possible to direct attacks at economically important cash crops and at vital 
animal husbandry. 
 
Current terrorism concerns 
Following the attack on the twin towers in New York and other targets in the United 
States on the 11th of September 2001, and then the anthrax letter attacks soon after, 
worries about bioterrorism grew.  An article in the 2002 Annual Review of Microbiology 
encapsulated many people’s concerns.  Titled “Bioterrorism: From Threat to Reality,” the 
article began:13
 
“The fears and predictions of attacks with biological weapons, which were 
increasing at the close of the twentieth century, were transformed into reality 
not long after September 11, 2001, when several anthrax-laden letters were 
sent through the U.S. postal system…” 
 
The article pointed out that it was fortunate the material had not been used in a massive 
aerosol release which could have affected thousands, and noted that whilst the problem 
was dealt with by the authorities, “[f]ear gripped the nation.”  Undoubtedly, many people 
were fearful about what might happen if terrorists were to use biological weapons in 
earnest.  National and international authorities reacted by reviewing and improving their 
safety precautions. 
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 It is known that national biodefence communities had long considered the 
possibility of bioterrorism.  In the United States tests had been carried out with pathogen 
simulants by the US Navy which released an aerosol off San Francisco and tested how far 
concentrations of organisms reached inland; simulants had been released on the New 
York subway and estimates made of how many people would be infected in a real attack 
and so on.  Similar analyses had been made in the UK and, no doubt, in other countries. 
 A Technical Note14 written by a member of the US Army at its main biodefence 
testing site (Dugway Proving Ground) recorded that: 
 
“The use of biological materials in conjunction with terrorist events has been 
addressed in various studies and reports (see Annex A)…” 
 
Annex A to this 1986 report listed nineteen US Army reports on the subject over the 
previous eleven years, and a further eight studies by institutes such as the Rand 
Corporation over the same period!  The introduction to the annex noted that the list of 
reports in the annex was intended to be a representative sample and pointed out that: 
 
“When, in 1973, DPG [Dugway Proving Ground] received a mission 
assignment…to maintain the program for technical assessments of foreign 
biological threats, one of the first studies was an assessment of the potential 
threat from the use of biological materials by terrorists.  Since that time, 
consideration of terrorist employment of biologicals…has been a continuing 
part of the program…” 
 
So in no sense did governments like those of the United States, the United Kingdom and 
others lack information on what terrorists might be able to do in biological attacks. 
 The second report in Annex A was titled Covert Biological Weapons Literature 
Review.15  This 1975 report sought to review the possibilities for a subversive group 
carrying out a biological weapons attack in the United States.  It specifically excluded 
large-scale, direct, aerosolised biological weapons as a means of covert attack by such a 
group, but concluded: 
 
“…BW agents can be used against man, animals, or plants.  Reports reviewed 
here show plainly that a…subversive group could produce a variety of 
effective BW agents, and deliver them against the civilian population and 
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agricultural and water resources of the United States by many covert and 
overt means…” 
 
So there can be little doubt that a terrorist group at the present time could carry out some 
small to medium-scale biological weapons attacks.  The situation in regard to a massive 
WMD aerosolised agent attack is quite different.  All the technical literature and opinion 
maintain the view that although the problems of production and dissemination have been 
solved in state programmes in the past it is presently still unlikely that a sub-state group 
would have the necessary capabilities and resources.  As Milton Leitenberg of the Center 
for International and Security Studies in the School of Public Affairs at the University of 
Maryland has emphasized:16
 
“…threat assessment, most particularly regarding ‘BW terrorism’ – the 
potential for BW use by non-state actors - has been greatly exaggerated…” 
 
Speaking at a meeting organised under the auspices of the Italian Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs in April 2002, Leitenberg went on to argue that this exaggeration was counter-
productive both in suggesting to those with malign intent that they should be interested in 
biological warfare, and in distorting priorities for investment in public health.  So it is 
necessary to be careful and to keep the threats in realistic proportion as we examine some 
recent analyses. 
 
Anti-agriculture bioterrorism 
As many experts have cogently argued, it is agriculture that is particularly vulnerable at 
present to bioterrorism.  Potential attacks on agriculture have been characterised as 
“[l]ow-tech, high consequence bioterrorism.”  The reasons for this characterisation are 
not at all difficult to understand.  Many studies suggest that this kind of bioterrorism 
would require relatively little in the way of specialist knowledge, technical expertise or 
technology.  The diseases are highly contagious to the intended targets (but not to 
humans), would therefore spread rapidly, and would cost a great deal of money to 
eradicate.  An added cost would come from the losses in international trade that would 
follow as other countries tried to protect themselves from the disease. 
 Taking the United States as an example, one recent analysis argued:17
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 “…Pathogens that cause diseases such as FMD, rinderpest, African Swine 
Fever (ASF), soybean rust, Philippine downy mildew of maize, potato wart, 
and citrus greening, could, if introduced into the continental US, have serious 
consequences for the US economy.” 
 
After the first case of FMD was reported in the UK outbreak of 2001 the European Union 
and others immediately blocked imports of British beef, sheep and pigs and the products 
derived from them, and the authors noted that the scale of the US industry is much 
greater than that of the UK.  They concluded that “with $37 billion of beef, $23 billion of 
dairy and $9.2 billion of pork sales annually (USDA, 1999), the trade consequences of an 
outbreak of FMD would be much larger.”  They emphasized this point by referring to a 
recent study using very conservative estimates of the impact of an FMD outbreak on 
Californian agriculture which suggested a $6-13 billion loss – even if confined just to 
California and eradicated within 5-12 weeks. 
 Taking another example, they pointed out that even though kernel bunt of wheat, 
caused by the fungus Tilleta indica, does not have a large direct effect on crop yield, 
about 80 countries ban wheat imports from regions infected with the fungus.  The disease 
was discovered in Arizona in 1996, probably through an accidental introduction from 
Mexico, and produced an immediate threat to the $6 billion per year US wheat crop of 
which about 50 per cent is exported.  The US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and 
Plant Health Service therefore spent some $60 million on eradicating the disease between 
1996 and 1998 while the growers in the small area affected were estimated to have lost 
over $100 million in sales and through extra production costs incurred. 
 Against that kind of background it is obvious that potential attacks against 
agriculture using biological weapons must be taken seriously.  Whether they are taken 
sufficiently seriously today is an open question. 
 
Catastrophic bioterrorism 
Despite the arguments presented so far indicating that we may not have paid enough 
attention yet to biological weapons attacks on agriculture and to smaller-scale attacks on 
humans, it is obvious from the rapid evolution of biotechnology that we neglect to think 
about large-scale attacks in the future at our peril.  One person who has tried to think this 
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issue through over a number of years is Richard Danzig, the former US Navy Secretary.  
He has been concerned with what he calls “catastrophic bioterrorism” and is far from 
sanguine about the problem. 
 Danzig argues, in part, that the aim of the terrorist is to disable good governance, 
enhance divisiveness and undermine the confidence of citizens in their government.  
Writing in August 2003, he argued strikingly that:18
 
“…Biological terrorism affords the possibility of repeated attack, 
undermining confidence and forcing ever-escalating investments of resources 
to achieve a modicum of defence…” 
 
He went on to point out that terrorists’ ability to carry out repeated attacks could remain 
intact while a government’s ability to manage the consequences of the attacks could be 
exhausted.  Here we encounter the quite new concept of a terrorist campaign using 
bioweapons rather than the usual one of an isolated attack with biological weapons.  This 
is the much more serious problem that Danzig wishes us to consider.  He advises us to 
“Plan to defend against a campaign not just an attack.” 
 But just how does a government go about planning to defend against such 
complexities – so many agents, so many targets, so many different scenarios?  In 
Danzig’s view, a way forward is to try to devise a representative range of possible attacks 
(planning cases) and to work out what capabilities would be required to deal with them.  
The planning cases have to be drawn up with care, but Danzig views the cases themselves 
as much less important than the process of trying to work out what those capabilities 
would be.  The cases are, in short, “an anvil against which to hammer out our 
hypotheses…and test the validity of different strategies.” 
 Working, of course, in the context of the United States, but presumably taking 
into account the thinking of experts in other countries, Danzig suggested four planning 
cases which he felt would “represent our most significant risks, illuminate how our 
systems would be taxed, and stimulate a broad range of preparations.”  The cases were: 
 
 1. A large-scale outdoor aerosol anthrax attack; 
 2. A large-scale outdoor aerosol smallpox attack; 
 3. An attack that disseminates botulinum toxin in cold drinks; and 
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 4. An attack that spreads foot and mouth disease among cattle, sheep and pigs. 
 
He argued that these cases will encompass most others we can think of.  For example, 
plague is a bacterium like anthrax and is contagious like smallpox, so if we have the 
general capabilities required to deal with anthrax and smallpox we shall have gone a long 
way towards being able to deal with plague.  An attack with plague is thus a included 
case as it is far less contagious than smallpox and more responsive to treatment than 
anthrax (although it will naturally require appropriate specific vaccines and treatment 
regimes). 
 Danzig’s thinking, has a further suggestion that we should note.  As 
biotechnology evolves and the strategic situation develops, we must be sensitive to the 
possibility that bioterrorism will also evolve.  This suggests to Danzig the need for a 
“Case 5 Committee”  deliberately tasked with analysing the evolution of the potential 
threat and with suggesting changes to the four planning cases when that becomes 
necessary. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Since the middle of the twentieth century it has been clear that if sufficient resources 
were to be applied to the problem biological weapons of mass destruction could be 
created.  It has also been clear that lesser anti-personnel attacks on military or civilian 
targets would be possible without the application of such large resources and that 
agriculture would be particularly vulnerable to attack with biological agents. 
 We have been fortunate indeed that to date such resources have been applied only 
to a limited extent in major hostilities.  It is often forgotten that the Japanese expended 
vast resources in attacking the Chinese with bioweapons before and during the Second 
World War and that the United States carried out a large-scale campaign of plant 
destruction during the Vietnam War using material such as Agent Orange – a synthetic 
bioregulator.  In a sense then, the growing worries about military, and particularly 
terrorist use of biological weapons is just the reawakening of public concern about issues 
that were well aired decades ago. 
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 In reality, very little has changed except the renewed perception of threat.  
However, the revolution in biology has greatly accelerated over those years and we face 
the threat in coming decades of a much more systematic application of the new biology to 
hostile purposes.  Though today it remains almost certainly the case that an aerosolised 
WMD bioattack is only possible in a state programme, in the future - if we are unable to 
prevent the thoroughgoing militarization of biology - it seems likely that sub-state 
groups, and perhaps even deranged individuals, may gain the capabilities to cause mass 
human casualties. 
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